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Introduction 
 
North Korea’s nuclear aspirations have served as the driving force for the development of 
ad hoc security multilateralism in Northeast Asia.  This development has occurred in 
stages, with each successive phase in responding to the North Korean crisis resulting in 
strengthened regional cooperation, despite persisting underlying strategic mistrust among 
the parties.  This presentation will briefly evaluate the significance and contributions of 
three stages in the development of ad hoc security multilateralism in Northeast Asia:  
KEDO, the Four-Party Talks/establishment of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight 
Group (TCOG), and the Six Party Talks.  Then, the author will offer a critical evaluation 
of prospects for Six Party Talks and analyze whether the six party process might develop 
into a permanent feature of the security architecture in Northeast Asia or whether a fourth 
stage might be necessary to achieve a lasting security framework for the region.  The 
author will also evaluate the extent to which the North Korean nuclear issue and the U.S.-
led bilateral alliance system, respectively, may be both a catalyst and an obstacle to the 
establishment of an effective Northeast Asian regional security framework. 
 
Development of Ad Hoc Security Multilateralism in Asia 
 
North Korea’s unilateral pursuit of a nuclear weapons capacity has ironically been the 
primary catalyst for new the development of new forms of multilateral security 
cooperation in Northeast Asia during the past two decades.  Although there had been 
official calls for the development of a regional security forum prior to the emergence of 
the North Korean nuclear issue, it was only in the context of responding to the North 
Korean nuclear issue that such ideas took concrete form. 
 
Tangible forms of regional cooperation in response to North Korea’s nuclear challenge 
have developed on an ad hoc basis through three phases since the early 1990s.  The first 
phase came in the aftermath of a bilateral agreement between the United States and the 
DPRK, the Geneva Agreed Framework, signed on October 21, 1994.  That agreement 
called for the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Development Organization (KEDO), 
an international organization that operated outside of governmental channels but was 
under the supervision of the governments that constituted KEDO’s governing board.  In 
the late 1990s, new doubts about North Korean covert nuclear activities and a desire to 
move forward in addressing peace and security issues on the Korean peninsula led to the 
establishment of the Four Party Talks, which served as a primary political vehicle for 
engaging North Korea in the aftermath of the food crisis of the late 1990s.  A separate 
“minilateral” institution also developed during this period, the Trilateral Coordination 
and Oversight Group (TCOG), which consisted of high-level governmental 
representatives from the U.S, Japan, and South Korea.  The third stage in the 
development of ad hoc security multilateralism in Northeast Asia came with the 
establishment of the Six Party Talks as a mechanism for dealing with the second North 
Korean nuclear crisis, following the discovery of an alleged covert North Korean 
program designed to develop nuclear capabilities through a uranium-enrichment path. 
This development also marked the demise of KEDO.  At this writing, the Six Party Talks 
is in crisis, and may possibly be replaced by a fourth stage in the development of 
multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, possibilities for which will be 
explored later in this paper. 
 
a) KEDO 
 
The 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework that froze North Korea’s nuclear program and tied 
full denuclearization to the provision of two 1000-megawatt light water reactors was a 
result of bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Korea.  But it became 
clear in the course of negotiating such an agreement that a multilateral body would have 
to be created to oversee the implementation of the Agreed Framework.  This result was a 
tacit admission that while bilateral negotiation that developed between the United States 
and North Korea at the behest of the United Nations from May of 1993 was necessary but 
not sufficient to address the North Korean nuclear issue. Thus, the Agreed Framework 
authorized the establishment of a multilateral consortium named the Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization (KEDO), to implement the terms of the deal.  North 
Korea reluctantly was forced to accept the necessity of South Korean and Japanese 
technical and political involvement in the project, and even came to accept KEDO as a 
legitimate counterpart, albeit under an authorization that ultimately originated in a 
bilateral U.S.-DPRK agreement.  This tension in the relationship between the U.S.-DPRK 
bilateral relationship and the development of multilateral approaches to North Korea 
would persist as a theme and as a contentious issue in subsequent multilateral approaches 
to the North Korean issue.   
 
The establishment of KEDO was a practical step forward in forging multilateral 
cooperation to meet North Korea’s energy security needs as a solution to the North 
Korean nuclear crisis.  KEDO’s governing board included representatives from Japan, 
South Korea, the United States, and the European Union, but China and Russia declined 
to participate in the project.1  Thus, KEDO provided a unique institutional framework 
through which Japanese and South Korean diplomats worked with each other together 
with U.S. colleagues. Such a development was not insubstantial, given the tragic 
historical pall that hangs over Japan-ROK relations.  But as an exercise in building 
regional cooperation, the core membership was incomplete.  The multilateral nature of 
the KEDO process also had collateral benefits in promoting inter-Korean technical 
contacts and indirectly contributed to an improvement in inter-Korean relations in 
advance of the advent of South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” in 1998 under then-president 
Kim Dae Jung.   
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b) Four Party Talks/TCOG 
 
The next phase in the development of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia 
was marked by two multilateral approaches in the late 1990s.  The Four Party Talks were 
established in 1997 by the United States, China, North and South Korea in an attempt to 
promote confidence building measures and move from an armistice to a peace regime on 
the Korean peninsula.  Although the actual four party proposal was a product of a 
political need on the part of South Korea to provide political justification for President 
Clinton to come to South Korea, the forum did eventually get off the ground despite 
North Korea’s initial reluctance to participate.  A famine-stricken North Korea tied its 
participation to the provision of food aid from the United States through the UN World 
Food Programme, but the North Koreans showed little interest in pursuing substantive 
dialogue beyond their commitment to participate.  Ironically, a significant 
accomplishment of the four party talks was to lay the foundations for Chinese 
cooperation with the United States and South Korea rather than the achievement of any 
significant progress on problems involving North Korea.   
 
At the same time, the later 1990s saw the establishment of the Trilateral Coordination and 
Oversight Group (TCOG) among the United States, South Korea, and Japan.  At the same 
time, suspicions about covert North Korean nuclear efforts at Keumchangri (later proved 
unfounded) and North Korea’s Taepodong launch in 1998 catalyzed the establishment of 
TCOG to address differences in policy priorities among the three countries.2  This group 
was established as a by-product of a review of U.S. policy led by former Defense 
Secretary William Perry. Through the TCOG process, the United States, Japan, and South 
Korea supported cooperative efforts to engage North Korea in more active cooperation on 
the basis of Kim Dae Jung’s sunshine policy.     
 
c) Six Party Talks 
 
The six party talks was established in the wake of revelations in October of 2002 that 
North Korea had been pursuing a covert uranium enrichment program.  These 
revelations, which became public in the wake of Assistant Secretary of State James 
Kelly’s visit to Pyongyang for talks with North Korean officials, led to the unraveling of 
the Agreed Framework.  The discovery of the violation of the spirit if not the letter of the 
Agreed Framework led to a spiraling crisis as North Korea kicked out International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, reprocessed spent fuel rods stored under the 
Agreed Framework, and resumed production of bomb-grade fissile material by re-starting 
its 5 megawatt nuclear reactor in December of 2002 and January of 2003.   
 
Drawing on perceived lessons from the experience of the Clinton-era Agreed Framework, 
the Bush administration sought a venue for multilateral dialogue rather than bilateral 
dialogue with North Korea.  Those lessons included the perception that a bilateral 
negotiation with a duplicitous North Korea would enhance the likelihood that the North 
would fail to live up to its agreements, the recognition that the North Korean nuclear 
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issue was in fact a Northeast Asian regional security problem as much as a challenge to 
the national security of the United States, that other parties had both leverage and a 
strategic stake in preventing North Korea from attaining nuclear weapons, and that U.S. 
leverage/pressure by itself would not be sufficient to convince North Korea to give up its 
nuclear weapons pursuits.  The establishment of the six party process represented a third 
step in the evolution of multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia focused on North 
Korea-related matters, building on the multilateral experience of the Korean Peninsula 
Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and the four-party talks/TCOG experiences 
of the late 1990s. 
 
A prerequisite for the establishment of the six party talks was China’s more proactive 
response to a renewed nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, in contrast to China’s 
passive response during the first North Korean nuclear crisis of the 1990s.  Motivated in 
part by concerns that the U.S.-DPRK confrontation of early 2003 might lead to a military 
conflict, Chinese leaders initially brokered a three-way U.S.-PRC-DPRK meeting in 
April of 2003, a meeting which led to the establishment of the six party process with the 
inclusion of South Korea, Japan, and Russia as participants in the talks in August of that 
year.  China’s multiple roles as a host, broker, mediator, and stakeholder in the six party 
process have given Beijing multiple incentives to promote the continuation and the 
success of the process as a vehicle for achieving denuclearization on the Korean 
peninsula. 
 
The primary achievement of the six party talks to date has been the crafting of a Joint 
Statement on September 19, 2005.  This statement commits all the parties to a lowest-
common denominator shared set of common principles or objectives:  a) denuclearization 
of the Korean peninsula, b) normalization of bilateral diplomatic relations among 
members of the six party talks, c) the importance of economic development, including 
provision of economic assistance for North Korea, d) the establishment of a permanent 
peace on the Korean peninsula.  Since this is the first time that the parties in question 
have identified common interests, the Joint Statement might be seen as a minimalist 
version of the Helsinki Final Act principles agreed to by the Conference on Security 
Cooperation in Europe during the 1970s.   
 
However, following the negotiation of the Joint Statement, the talks were suspended for 
almost a year as a result of North Korea’s negative response to the U.S. designation of 
Banco Delta Asia (BDA) as a threat to the international banking system as a result of 
North Korean alleged money laundering and counterfeiting activities through accounts at 
BDA.  The North Koreans suspended their participation in the talks following a 
November 2005 meeting.  The talks did not resume until December of 2006, following 
North Korea’s nuclear test and in a context in which the United States indicated a 
willingness to resolve the BDA issue with North Korea. 
 
Following North Korea’s nuclear test, the six parties ratified elements of an agreement 
that had been worked out at a bilateral U.S.-DPRK meeting held in January of 2006. The 
February 13, 2007 implementing agreement laid out steps that the six parties would take 
to provide North Korea with energy assistance and to remove North Korea from the U.S. 
terrorism list and Trading With the Enemy Act in return for North Korea’s disablement of 
the facilities at Yongbyong and declaration of its nuclear-related facilities.  Originally 
envisioned to be implemented within ninety days, the clock ran out on the Bush 
administration’s efforts to achieve a satisfactory understanding regarding how North 
Korea’s declaration of its facilities might be verified.  In a speech to The Asia Society 
prior to her first visit abroad as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton signaled the Obama 
administration’s continued commitment to the six party process. 
 
 
Future of the Six Party Talks at a Moment of Crisis 
 
Following a rapid and aggressive series of missile and nuclear tests by North Korea in 
April and May of 2009, the six party process once again finds itself in crisis. In response 
to the UN Security Council’s April 13, 2009 Presidential Statement condemning North 
Korea’s missile launch, the DPRK foreign ministry responded a day later by stating that 
“six-party talks have lost the meaning of their existence never to recover” and that the 
“DPRK will never participate in such six-party talks nor will it be bound any longer to 
any agreement of the talks.”3  Although all the other parties have indicated their 
continued commitment to the six party process, many analysts believe that the six party 
process is finally dead. 
 
This is not the first time that commentators have declared the talks to be dead.  A 
thirteen-month hiatus surrounding the 2004 U.S. presidential election raised similar 
doubts among many analysts.  The on-again, off-again nature of the six party process has 
been a major reason for criticizing the talks as ineffective and for seeking alternative 
organizing principles, including the possibility of establishing a five party process.4  
However, China has continuously refused to sign on to such a process.  As a result, the 
six party process has in some ways been held hostage to the peculiarities of the North 
Korean agenda:  the talks can’t meet unless North Korea agrees and North Korea’s 
participation ensures that the talks will focus on North Korea.  China refuses to 
participate in five party talks for fear that such talks would further alienate the North, 
despite the fact that the long-term establishment of an effective regional security dialogue 
in Northeast Asia will depend on the development of an agenda for the region that goes 
beyond North Korea.  Now that the talks are off again, it is natural to question whether 
such talks can really be useful in promoting an effective and lasting diplomatic solution, 
but the six party talks offer the following unique advantages over the alternative 
diplomatic paths currently available: 
 
 
• The six party talks are the only venue in which the North Koreans have made a 
public commitment to denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.  The September 
19, 2005 Joint Statement clearly states that the end goal of the six party process is 
“denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.” This means that any implementing 
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agreements developed as part of the six party process should include naturally 
include elements designed to implement that objective.  Conversely, the 
abandonment of the six party process might serve North Korea’s strategic 
objective of promoting its acceptance as a nuclear weapons state, absolving North 
Korea of the denuclearization commitment it made as part of the six party 
process. 
 
• The six party process continues to serve as an umbrella for bilateral discussions 
designed to implement the objectives of the talks.  Among the objectives of the 
six party talks is the normalization of bilateral relations among all the parties; 
thus, the six party process naturally contributes to the achievement of this aim.  
The process implicitly underscores the principle that improved bilateral 
diplomatic relations among the main parties are a development beneficial to the 
promotion of regional peace and stability. 
 
• The six party process may also be a means by which to pressure individual 
countries that attempt to resist or deny the agreed-upon objectives and regional 
consensus embodied in the September 2005 Six Party Joint Statement.  The 
commitment to the implementation of the Six Party Joint Statement has 
stimulated bilateral and trilateral consultations among members of the six party 
talks designed to implement the shared goals and consensus embodied in the six 
party process. 
 
• The United States commitment to six party talks has become the primary tangible 
means by which the United States is able to demonstrate its continued 
commitment to North Korea’s denuclearization in light of increasing skepticism 
that North Korea will abandon its nuclear weapons.  In light of doubts and 
concerns across the region that the primary diplomatic objective of the United 
States may shift from denuclearization to non-proliferation, thereby tacitly 
accepting a nuclear North Korea as an acceptable part of a new regional status 
quo, it is particularly important that the United States remain committed to 
implementing the agenda of the six party talks. 
 
 
The challenge of reconstituting the six party process as a viable means by which to 
address regional security in Northeast Asia is a daunting one, in light of North Korea’s 
announcement of its withdrawal from the talks.  But the commitment of the other parties 
to the six party process despite North Korea’s statement that it would “never” return to 
the six party process sends an important signal to North Korea regarding the regional 
commitment to North Korea’s denuclearization.  North Korea’s early challenge to the 
Obama administration over the shape of diplomatic engagement is also a test that will 
shape the agenda and form of diplomacy going forward.  How the Obama administration 
responds to this challenge will influence its future prospects for success. 
 
At this moment, there are many reasons to think that the six party talks is dead, and that 
events have finally outstripped the rationale underlying such a process.  But it is also 
important that the core regional commitments to denuclearization, peace, stability, and 
economic development of North Korea not be abandoned.  Any new process that takes 
the region backwards or unravels such a consensus will ultimately not serve the best 
interests of all parties to the talks.  For this reason, the focus of diplomacy should remain 
the reestablishment of the six party process rather than settling for a lesser alternative or 
going back to a less complete form of diplomatic interaction that privileges bilateral talks 
to the exclusion of a role for North Korea’s neighbors to ratify and affirm their stakes and 
interests in any negotiated outcome with North Korea. 
 
 
Prospects for the Development of a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism5 
 
Some analysts have pointed to the six party process, as the latest stage in the development 
of ad hoc multilateral approaches to the North Korean nuclear challenge, as having 
arguably laid the foundations for the development of a permanent regional security 
mechanism in Northeast Asia.  The September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of the Six Party 
Talks provides a barebones lowest common denominator set of principles that might form 
the basis for common action in the sphere of regional politics and security, essentially 
identifying the objectives of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, normalization 
of diplomatic relations among all six parties, economic development on the Korean 
peninsula, and the pursuit of a permanent peace regime as the basis for future 
cooperation.   
 
As the lowest common denominator set of agreed principles among major parties in 
Northeast Asia, the Joint Statement has laid a foundation for regional cooperation that is 
somewhat analogous to the role of the Helsinki Final Act, which provided the basis for 
institutionalization of security cooperation in Europe through the Committee on Security 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).6  However, the Joint Statement provides a much more 
narrow mandate for promotion of regional cooperation than did the Helsinki Final Act, 
suggesting that the basis for institutionalized regional security cooperation in Northeast 
Asia remains much more narrow than was the case in Europe in the 1970s.  James 
Goodby argues that the operationalization of a Northeast Asian peace and security 
mechanism along the lines of the Helsinki Final Act might draw on language regarding 
freedom of travel and contact and the establishment of military confidence building 
measures, some of which have already been agreed to but never fully implemented in the 
1992 inter-Korean Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and 
Cooperation (known as the Basic Agreement).7 
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Following the announcement of the February 13, 2007, six party talks implementing 
agreement that outlined the first steps to be taken toward denuclearization and 
normalization of relations between North Korea and the United States and North Korea 
and Japan, the six parties have formed five working groups, including one to establish a 
Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism as a multilateral vehicle for promoting 
security beyond the settlement of the North Korean nuclear crisis.  The creation of the 
Northeast Asia Peace and Security working group as the single working group that has 
been envisioned to outlast the six party process shows that all the participants in the six 
party talks have now officially accepted in principle the idea of a permanent, 
institutionalized regional security framework, although there are clearly differing ideas 
about how such a mechanism would work in practice. One might argue that despite the 
provisional nature of the Six Party Talks, with its sole focus on the North Korean nuclear 
issue, the establishment of the Six Party Talks is in fact an institutionalized multilateral 
mechanism in Northeast Asia.   
 
Some have argued that the establishment of the six party talks itself has had positive 
collateral influence in terms of promoting confidence building among the parties, 
developing habits of cooperation, providing venues for bilateral cooperation even in the 
context of strained political relations, and providing a vehicle for managing tensions 
related to the North Korean nuclear crisis.  But differing perspectives among the 
countries on the utility of the six party process suggest that these positive contributions 
do not necessarily guarantee that the six party talks will be institutionalized or lead to the 
establishment of a regional security mechanism.8  Jack Pritchard has suggested that the 
key ingredient currently missing from the establishment of a Northeast Asian security 
architecture is U.S. leadership, and that there is an emerging set of common interests 
(transparency, avoidance of miscalculation, peaceful dispute resolution, disaster relief, 
energy security, pandemic response coordination, and avoidance of incidents at sea) in 
support of which all the regional parties should be willing to join together.9 
 
 
Perceived Challenges to the Development of a Permanent Northeast Asian Regional 
Security Mechanism:  North Korean Nuclear Issue 
 
If the Six Party Talks represents the first step toward the institutionalization of security 
cooperation in Northeast Asia, its establishment also suggests that the role and prospects 
for such an institutional dialogue beyond dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue 
may also face significant obstacles.  First, the focus of the Six Party process solely on 
North Korea has the effect of limiting the capacity and utility of the talks to address 
traditional and non-traditional regional security issues beyond North Korea.  By this 
logic, once the North Korean nuclear issue is no longer with us, it is hard to imagine a 
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security agenda that would successfully mobilize full and constructive participation by all 
the parties at the negotiating table.  Instead of envisioning the institutionalization of a 
multilateral security forum that will grow out of the six party talks, it may turn out that 
the six party talks is already a multilateral security forum but that the salience of that 
forum is directly tied to the existence of North Korea-related issues as problems to be 
resolved.   
 
Despite the “in principle” acceptance of the concept of a Northeast Asia Peace and 
Security Mechanism to be established beyond the North Korean nuclear crisis, it is hard 
to imagine on which issues the mechanism would generate a value added that would have 
unique application to Northeast Asia or go beyond the contributions of, for instance, the 
ASEAN Regional Forum in addressing issues unique to the stability and security of the 
region.  Contrary to the conventional wisdom that it is necessary for the six party talks to 
show success in order to provide the basis for a Northeast Asian regional security 
mechanism, it is possible that such a mechanism may be more likely to become semi-
permanent in the event that North Korea-related issues continue to be a preoccupation 
and a focal point for regional cooperation on a protracted basis—or that North Korean 
political stability and economic reconstruction be adapted as an agenda for regional 
cooperation that extends beyond the nuclear issue itself. 
 
Second, if North Korea were not the focal point of the talks, it is questionable under 
current circumstances whether any other issue would be “big” enough to mobilize 
effective regional dialogue and cooperation.  Functional or non-traditional security issues 
may be addressed in other fora and do not inherently capture the same level of priority 
among participants in the six party talks.  It is difficult to imagine that Northeast Asia’s 
great powers would allow bilateral territorial or political disputes to be regionalized, even 
if those issues have spillover security effects on the rest of the region.   
 
Third, the reluctance of the six parties to meet without North Korea illustrates the extent 
to which North Korea continues to control the agenda for the talks despite the common 
regional interests in stability and co-prosperity that are threatened by North Korea.  North 
Korea’s presence changes the nature of the dialogue and inhibits frank conversation 
regarding the collective interests and priorities of the other regional actors, yet it has also 
been impossible thus far for regional actors to discuss their common interests openly in 
the absence of North Korea.  Despite efforts by the Bush administration to hold such a 
meeting and recommendations from several quarters that advocate the establishment of a 
Northeast Asia Regional Forum to address security, energy, health, and economic issues, 
the fact that it has thus far been impossible to establish a Northeast Asian five party 
dialogue for fear of what the North Koreans will think—even if the proposed agenda is 
not North Korea-focused—illustrates the extent to which North Korean issues both hold 
regional dialogue hostage as well as the difficulty of having a regional dialogue that does 
not focus on North Korea.10  The dysfunctional nature of the six party talks in this respect 
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framework or venue for discussion of common interests in security and prosperity. 
 
The current crisis raises the question of whether a fourth-stage multilateral security 
dialogue might develop to replace the third stage.  For instance, if North Korea were to 
permanently end its participation in the six party process and China were to accept the 
validity of a five-party “contact group” through which to discuss the challenges posed by 
North Korea, this five-party discussion might mark such a new stage in the evolution of 
multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia.  The advantages of such a dialogue 
would be that it would promote the possibility of an effective collective response that 
might finally compel North Korea to address the core issues related to its nuclear 
program.  It is also possible that there could be a reversion to one of the previous stages 
that has already been delineated above.   
 
 
 Northeast Asian Regional Security Mechanism:   
Implications for America’s Asian Alliances 
 
A second issue that continues to draw considerable debate related to the establishment of 
a multilateral security architecture in Northeast Asia is the question of whether such a 
structure should serve as a replacement for or as a complement to the existing U.S. 
bilateral alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea.  It has become standard practice 
for Chinese to characterize the concept of alliance as a legacy of the Cold War and to 
underscore the need to abandon alliance thinking in favor of security multilateralism as a 
more suitable model for preserving cooperation among states in the future, while 
conventional wisdom among American analysts is that there is no contradiction between 
America’s Asian alliances and the establishment of a multilateral security framework in 
Northeast Asia.11 In fact, some American analysts may argue that common values among 
democratic states may enable the expansion of tasks in the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK 
alliances, and that those tasks might be synchronized as part of a regional approach to 
cooperation that emphasizes common objectives of both alliances to maintain regional 
stability. This sort of approach also sees an important role for the U.S.-led alliance 
network to play a balancing role in the context of China’s rise, for instance, in the context 
of the idea of a League of Democracies proposed by presidential candidate John McCain 
in 2008.   
 
Because the alliances have served American interests well for so long, there is a 
hesitancy among American analysts to feel a strong need for innovation in this area or to 
respond to Asian desires for enhanced regional cooperation, especially in the security 
sphere.  If the impetus for East Asian community building were to take off, such a 
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development would have an indirect impact on U.S.-led alliances to the extent that the 
establishment of cooperation lessens security dilemmas faced within the region and lays 
the foundation for cooperative security.  But Japan’s incomplete reconciliation with the 
rest of Asia over history, an ongoing regional rivalry between China and Japan, and the 
perceived need to hedge against the negative possibilities that might result from China’s 
rise make it unlikely that the United States or its allies would be convinced to abandon 
the alliance framework in favor of cooperative security anytime soon. 
The United States is already pursuing regionalism in its response to North Korea’s 
security challenge by attempting to mobilize a coordinated response through the six 
party process.  This effort recognizes that the issue cannot be resolved satisfactorily 
using only deterrence and bilateral talks.  The emergence of six party talks 
recognizes that the North Korean nuclear issue will require the collective 
involvement of all the parties neighboring North Korea if such a deal is going to 
“stick.”  Again, the six party mechanism is a tool to be used in conjunction with 
alliance cooperation, not supplanting the alliances with another form of security 
structure in Northeast Asia.  For most American analysts, the idea of multilateral 
dialogue as a supplement to the alliances as a foundation for assuring peace and 
stability in Northeast Asia is quite reasonable, but the continued existence of 
conflicting strategic aims among stakeholders in the region suggests that any idea of 
abandoning the alliances in favor of a multilateral security mechanism is implausible. 
 
It is worth thinking through circumstances under which the United States might be more 
positively disposed to taking a more active role in Asian regionalism.  For instance, if 
China were to experience a change in its system and become a democracy, would this 
development remove the perceived need for U.S.-led bilateral alliances and pave the way 
for cooperative security in Asia?  What are the possible regional security implications of 
a situation in which the United States no longer plays the role of anchor for the global 
financial system?  Another factor that has strengthened the desirability of alliances has 
been America’s own inability to play the role of sole provider of public goods.  To the 
extent that partnerships and regional coalitions can play a role in multilateralizing the 
provision of international public goods through joint response to monitoring of sea 
lanes, multilateral provision of disaster relief, and joint responsibility for managing 
environmental issues such as climate change, these responses may contribute to 
American interest in Asian regionalism and might pose significant challenges to the 
continuation of America’s Asian alliances in their current form. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined how North Korea’s nuclear pursuits have served to catalyze ad 
hoc security multilateralism in Northeast Asia over the course of the past two decades.  
On the one hand, the magnitude of North Korea’s challenge to common regional security 
interests has brought regional actors together and has served as a focal point for the 
development of a collective regional response to this challenge.  On the other hand, there 
is no other issue beyond North Korea’s nuclear challenge that appears to be sufficiently 
compelling to overcome underlying security dilemmas or to drive the institutionalization 
of regional security cooperation among Northeast Asian countries.  Although the North 
Korean nuclear issue has promoted habits of cooperation that could be regularized if they 
were to take root sufficiently that such a dialogue were perceived as serving the collective 
interests of all participants in the region, there is not yet sufficient reason in the view of 
this author to expect that any other issue will emerge as the basis for regional collective 
action in Northeast Asia.   
 
Some may argue that the U.S.-led alliance structure itself is a major factor inhibiting the 
development of such cooperation because any good alliance needs an enemy to be 
targeted against.  It is this idea that has led many Chinese analysts to classify the U.S.-led 
alliances as a historical relic of the cold war.  However, such a view does not take into 
consideration the idea that the glue holding alliances together might also derive from 
cooperation that stands for something rather than being focused on a common threat.  
This emerging rationale for alliance cooperation is double-edged, however, since existing 
alliances can also be used to hedge against the possibility of an emerging threat.  To the 
extent that such a hedging strategy is still perceived as useful to ensure the security needs 
of alliance partners, it is much more likely that U.S.-led alliances will continue to develop 
in tandem with multilateral security cooperation rather than in opposition to such 
cooperation.  To the extent that security multilateralism proves itself to be an effective 
and constructive contributor to keeping the peace by promoting high levels of mutual 
trust in Northeast Asia, such a development might make the alliances obsolete. Until 
then, it is likely that security multilateralism in Northeast Asia will continue to develop 
on an ad hoc basis in response to specific challenges that require cooperation to 
successfully manage. 
 
This paper was first presented June 4-5, 2009, at the conference “Nuclear Politics, North Korea and the 
Political Economy of Northeast Asia in the Wake of the World Economic Crisis” at the University of 
Washington.  
 
